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by Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
I am gratefulto ProfessorLeeforthe opportunity to comment on
this fine set of papers regarding the ethical obligations of government
lawyers. These papers shed light on many interesting aspects of
serving the government. Professors Shaffer and Lee explore the
peculiar challenges to integrity that a lawyer experiences when he has
a client who can chop his head off.' The challenges are less today, but
a lawyer with large student loans to pay may not realize that they are.
Professor Hazard points out that government lawyers are government
employees with the responsibilities that government employment
entails.2 Professor Green shows that government lawyers may also be
public officials with the duty offairness that all public officials share
These are all important points.
In stressing the obligation of government lawyers to seek justice,
Professor Green explicitly, and perhaps the whole panel implicitly,
indicates that private sector lawyers have no such obligation.4 That
view, I believe, must be firmly resisted. Lawyers are not "generally
expected to pursue their private clients' objectives, even if the truth is
derailed or the outcome is unjust."' Or if they are generally expected
to do so, they are not rightly expected to do so. In Indiana, and in a
number of other states, we still take an oath not to "counsel or
maintain any action, proceeding, or defense which shall appear to [us]
*Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Legal Ethics, Notre
Dame Law School.
I See Thomas L. Shaffer, More's Skill, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 295 (2000);
Randy Lee, Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons and the Art of Discerning
Integrity, 9 WIDENER L PUB. L. 305 (2000).
2 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Representation of
Public Agencies in CivilMafters?, 9 WIDENER '. PUB. L. 211 (2000).
1 See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers "Seek Justice" in Civil
Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235 (2000).
' Green, supra note 3, at 235-36.
51d at 235.
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unjust. ,,6 This language was adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1908.1 The Pennsylvania oath is differently worded,8 but the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in 1845 that a lawyer violates
the oath when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment.9
At another place, Green contrasts the duty of government lawyers
not to bring "bad" or undeserving civil cases with the duty of private
lawyers, which he limits to not taking frivolous positions. ' It is not
altogether clear to me what sort of case would be bad or undeserving,
but yet not frivolous. Whatever such a case would look like, I think to
bring it would be a violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11 and comparable state rules. Granted, Rule 11, as it has stood
since 1993, allows lawyers to be creative in their legal contentions as
long as their claims are "nonfrivolous."" But it requires all of their
factual claims to "have evidentiary support."'2 The version in force
from 1983 to 1993 required a pleading to be "well grounded in fact
and warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for the
modification, extension, or reversal of existing law."' 3 The pre-1983
version simply required "good ground to support" the pleading. 4
Many states use one of the earlier versions. Pennsylvania, as is often
the case, goes its own way. Rule 1023(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Court requires good ground, but adds language about good faith
arguments for changing the law." Rule 1024 requires all factual
assertions or denials to be verified. 6 I do not believe any ofthese rules
will permit private lawyers in civil litigation to content themselves
with avoiding frivolity.
6 IND. A.D.R. 22.
7 CANONS OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Oath of
Admission (1908).
8 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2522 (1998).
9Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845).
1o Green, supra note 3, at 240-41.
"FED. R. CIV. P.1 1(b)(6).
12Id. (b)(3).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1993).
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983).




A little farther on, Green asks the following: "Must the
government's civil litigators... correct or 'confess error,' or, like
private lawyers in civil litigation, may they freely encourage and
exploit it?""7 I do not believe private lawyers in civil litigation may
freely encourage and exploit error on the part of the courts before
whom they litigate. In the first place, I do not see how you can
"encourage" an erroneous decision except by advocating it, and
advocating a decision you know to be erroneous would seem to
violate Rule 11 as well as the other rules just discussed. Also, if you
know a decision is erroneous, it must be because there is controlling
authority in the jurisdiction that goes the other way. If such
controlling authority exists, a lawyer is obliged by Rule 3.3(a)(3) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to be candid and reveal it to
the court."8
So much for "encouraging" error. How about "exploiting" it? I
suppose you would be exploiting an error if you were to enforce a
judgment that the court erroneously awarded your client. On the other
hand, if the judgment is unjust, you should not have sought it in the
first place-for reasons I have already stated. If it is just, then you
should be able to take advantage of it as long as it is not being
appealed. But I cannot see why a government lawyer should not be
able to do the same.
Suppose the judgment is appealed. Can you brief and argue a case
for the appellee knowing for certain that the decision being appealed
from is dead wrong? Not without violating Rule 3.1 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, unless you have a basis for affrmance
that is not frivolous. 9 Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not apply to proceedings in the appellate courts, but some of the
state counterparts apply to all courts of the state. In any event, you
could not be certain a decision was erroneous unless you were sure it
would be reversed on appeal, in which case it would be a waste of
your time and your client's money to argue for affirmance.
17 Green, supra note 3, at 241.
'8 MODEL RULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (2000).
-T1d_ Rule 3.1.
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Green offers a number ofspecific instances to illustrate the special
responsibility of government lawyers.2" It is a little difficult to find
persuasive nongovernmental analogies for them, but as far as the
analogies go, they impose the same obligations on the lawyers
involved.
Green's first case is Williams v. Taylor,21 in which a state prisoner
sought federal habeas corpus on account of the prosecutor's failure to
make proper discovery at the trial or in post-conviction proceedings
in the state courts.' In supporting his claim, Green did not accuse the
state's lawyers of anything that would not have caused a private
lawyer's judgment to be set aside for misconduct under Federal Rule
60(b)(3) or a state counterpart.' For instance, one of the decisions in
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,24 part of the litigation described in the
famous book A Civil Action,25 set aside a judgment on just that
ground: the winning party had failed to make discovery of a
discoverable document. 26 Neither the absence of wrongful intent nor
the lack of perceptible effect on the outcome prevented the finding of
misconduct and the setting aside of the judgment.
Another case Green discusses is a proceeding brought by lawyers
for the New York City Commission on Human Rights on behalf of a
woman who complained of discrimination by her employer.27 As the
case proceeded, the City's lawyers came to believe that the
complainant was lying and the employer had done nothing wrong.28
Green asks the following question:
As advocates, was it proper for the city's lawyers to publicly
ask the administrative tribunal to credit the former
employee's testimony and find that the employer acted
impermissibly, even though the lawyers privately concluded
20 Green, supra note 3, at 243-56.
21 189 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 529 U.S. 420
(2000). See Green, supra note 3, at 243-46.
22 Williams, 189 F.3d at 427.
2 FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(3).
24 862 F.2d 910 (Ist Cir. 1988).
25 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
26Anderson, 862 F.2d at 933.
27 Green, supra note 3, at 24648.
21 Id at 24647.
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that the testimony was probably false and the claim unjust,
or, were they required to take the public position that
accorded with their genuine views?'
The City's lawyers decided they had to dismiss the case, because as
public servants they were obliged to seek justice? Green contrasts
their stand with that appropriate to a private attorney. He says that "if
... they represented the discharged employee-they could ethically
offer the questionable testimony in support of a claim they considered
unjust as long as they did not know that the former employee's
testimony was false."'" I disagree.
Granted, Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
merely pennits refusing to offer testimony the lawyer reasonably
believesto be false.32 The rule, however, requires refusal ifthe lawyer
knows the testimony is false.33 But if the lawyer believes that the Uhise
testimony will lead to an injustice as well as a deception, the oath I
have already referred to will preclude using it.' And even without an
oath, no system, however elaborate, can have it be morally acceptable
for anyone, lawyer or layman, to intentionally perpetrate an injustice.
But suppose we just think the discharged employee is lying. Can
we properly deprive her of her day in court-or her day before the
relevant administrative tribunal-on the basis of a guess? No, but no
more can the City's lawyers properly do so. Neither city lawyers nor
private lawyers are appointed to be judges. The 1908 Canons of
Ethics of the American Bar Association provide that a lawyer's
appearance in a case is "equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in
his opinion his client's case is one proper forjudicial determination."'
No more than that should be required of a government lawyer, and no
less should be required of a private lawyer.
Next, Green presents a hypothetical where a lawyer pursues a
time-barred claim and gets a favorable settlement because the
29Id at 247.
1, Id (emphasis in original).
3 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (2000).
'Id Rule 3.3(a)(4).
I See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text
35 CANONS OF ETHIcs OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Canon 30
(1908).
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defendant's lawyer does not realize that the statute of limitations has
expired.36 Green thinks this is acceptable conduct for a private lawyer
but not for a government lawyer. 7 He reports that the American Bar
Association thinks it is acceptable for either. 8 I think it is acceptable
for neither. Deliberately to initiate a time-barred claim is a violation
both of Procedure Rule 1 I and of Conduct Rule 3.1.0 Also, the
resulting settlement would be voidable under section 253 of the
Second Restatement of Contracts.4'
Green concludes his set of examples with lawyers asked to cope
with various forms of misconduct on the part of their governmental
clients.42 He believes, quite rightly, that their responsibility to the
public precludes simply circling the wagons and defending the officials
involved.43 He says "government lawyers must take a firm position in
favor of conforming government practices to the law."" But should
not corporate lawyers do the same for corporate practices? I
remember being told bythe general counsel of a corporation that more
of his time was spent advocating the law before the corporation than
advocating the corporation before the law.
His point is reinforced by a body of cases that extend
whistle-blower protection to corporate in-house lawyers in the same
way the protection is afforded other employees."5 Model Rule 1.13
' Green, supra note 3, at 248.
37 d.
38 d.
39 FED.R CIV. P. 11.
'0 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (2000).
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1979).
42 Green, supra note 3, at 249-54.
43 Id.
44Id. at 250 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical andPolitical Problems
ofa GovernmentAttorney, 18 ME. L. REv. 155, 163 (1966)).
'See, e.g., GeneralDynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487,502-03
(Cal. 1994) (en band) (holding that an in-house counsel could bring a retaliatory
discharge claim where such counsel was discharged for following mandatory
ethical obligations); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that an employee-attorney may bring a
wrongful discharge suit against his employer-client); but see Balla v. Gambro,
Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (IM. 1991) (holding that tort actions for wrongful
discharge are unavailable to in-house counsel).
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indicates that it is the lawyer's duty to blow the whistle if corporate
officials are acting contrary to the best interest of the corporation, or
are engaging in illegalities that might be attributed to the
corporation.' Butthe best interest ofthe corporation qua corporation
is to carry out the public purpose forwhich it was chartered. My first
job after law school was working in the General Counsel's Office of
Liberty Mutual. My superiors made it clear to me from the first day
that it was as much in the interest of the company to pay claims that
were covered by its policies as to resist claims that were not covered.
I do not at all mean by these criticisms to take anything away
from the importance of these papers in shedding light on the special
role of the government lawyer as a public servant. Government
lawyers are unique in their opportunity to serve the peace, order, and
well-being of their fellow citizens. They are unique in their
opportunity to maintain the democratic accountability of our leaders.
But they are not unique in their duty to refrain from perpetrating
injustice. That is the duty of every lawyer-indeed, of every human
being.
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (2000).
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